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Abstract
Financial crises are often associated with an endogenous credit reversal followed by a fall in
asset prices and serious disruptions in the financial sector. To account for this sequence of events,
this paper constructs a model where excessive risk-taking by investors leads to a bubble in asset
prices, and where the supply of credit to these investors is endogenous. We show that the interplay
between excessive risk-taking and the endogeneity of credit may give rise to multiple equilibria
associated with different levels of lending, asset prices, and output. Stochastic equilibria lead, with
positive probability, to an inefficient liquidity dry-up, a market crash, and widespread failures by
borrowers. The possibility of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling crises is shown to be related to
the severity of the risk-shifting problem in the economy.
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1 Introduction
The resurgence of financial crises over the past couple of decades or so, both in
developed and developing countries, has sparked renewed interest in the potential
sources of financial fragility and market imperfections from which they originate.
While each crisis naturally had its own particular features, it is now widely agreed
that many shared a common underlying pattern of destabilising credit and asset mar-
kets developments, with an initial lending and asset price boom abruptly ending in
a market crash and major disorders in the financial sector. The subprime mortgage
crisis that has disrupted worldwide financial markets from August 2007 on provides
a particularly dramatic example of such a crash, as it followed a prolonged phase
of sustained lending fostered by low interest rates, new financial instruments and
the poor ex ante pricing of the downside risk associated with falls in house prices.1
But the subprime mortgage crisis, as striking as it is due to the size of the losses
involved, is only the latest and most emblematic example of a long series. Amongst
OECD countries in the 1980s and early 1990s, such as Japan or the Scandinavian
countries, financial crises were an integral part of a broader credit cycle whereby
financial deregulation led to an increase in available credit, fuelled a period of over-
investment in real estate and stock markets, and led to high asset-price inflation.
These events were then followed by a credit contraction and the bursting of the as-
set bubble, causing the actual or near bankruptcy of the financial institutions which
had initially levered the asset investment.2 A similar sequence of events has also
been observed in a number of Asian and Latin American countries, where capital
account liberalisation allowed large amounts of capital to flow in during the 1990s,
with a similar effect of raising asset prices to unsustainable levels. This phase of
overlending often ended in a brutal capital account reversal followed by a market
crash and a banking crisis.3
An important theoretical issue, to date largely unanswered, is whether the
credit turnaround that typically accompanies financial crises is the outcome of an
autonomous, extrinsic reversal of expectations on the part of economic agents, or
simply the natural outcome of accumulated macroeconomic imbalances or policy
mistakes, i.e., the intrinsic fundamentals of the economy. Although expectational
factors certainly play a role in triggering financial crises, it has long been recog-
1See Greenlaw et al. (2008), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) and International Monetary
Fund (2008) for descriptive accounts of the boom-bust cycle in subprime mortgage loans, as well as
Bordo (2007) for a historical perspective on the crisis.
2See Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994) and Allen and Gale (1999, 2000), as well as the refer-
ences therein, for a more detailed account of these events.
3See Calvo (1998), Kaminsky (1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998, 1999) for evidence on
this sequence of events, often referred to as ‘sudden stop’.
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nised that theories based purely on self-fulfilling expectations clearly do not tell
the full story. In virtually all the recent episodes briefly mentioned above, specific
macroeconomic or structural sources of fragility preceded the actual occurrence of
the crisis. For example, poor risk assessment by both mortgage loan originators and
buyers of mortgage-backed securities played a central role in the subprime lending
bubble (International Monetary Fund, 2008). The OECD financial crises of the
late 1980s usually followed periods of loose monetary policy or poor exchange-rate
management (e.g., Borio et al., 1994). In emerging countries, the culprit was often
to be found in the weakness of the banking sector due to poor financial regulation,
as well as other factors such as unsustainable fiscal or exchange rate policies (Sum-
mers, 2000). Overall, the evidence from this latter group of countries indicates that
factors of fundamental weakness explain only some of the probability of a crisis,
suggesting that both fundamental and non-fundamental elements are at work in trig-
gering financial crises (see Kaminsky, 1999, and the discussion in Chari and Kehoe,
2003).
The model of financial crises that we develop below aims to account for both
the credit-asset price cycle typical of recent crises and the joint role of fundamental
and nonfundametal factors in making crises possible. In so doing, we draw on Allen
and Gale (2000), for whom financial crises are the natural outcome of credit rela-
tions where portfolio investors borrow to buy risky assets, and are protected against
bad payoff outcomes by the use of debt contracts with limited liability.4 Investors’
distorted incentives then lead them to overinvest in risky assets (i.e., a risk-shifting
problem arises), whose price consequently rises to high levels (leading to an asset
bubble), with the possibility that investors become bankrupt if asset payoffs turn out
badly (a financial crisis occurs). Unlike Allen and Gale, however, who study the
risk-shifting problem in isolation and thus make the partial-equilibrium assumption
that the amount of funds available to investors is exogenous, we allow for endoge-
nous variations in the supply of credit resulting from lenders’ utility-maximising
behaviour. We regard this alternative specification as not only more realistic, but
also particularly relevant to our understanding of recent crises episodes, where the
endogeneity of aggregate credit was frequently identified as being an important
source of financial instability.5
Our results indicate that the interdependence between excessive risk-taking
by investors and the elasticity of aggregate credit is indeed a serious cause of en-
dogenous instability. First, we show that, under risk-shifting, the equilibrium return
that lenders expect from lending to investors may be non-monotonic and increase
4See also Acharya (2009) for an analysis of systemic risk generated by a risk-shifting problem
similar to that in Allen and Gale (2000) and in the present paper.
5See, for example, Edison, Luangaram and Miller (2000) for a contribution which is representa-
tive of this view.
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with the aggregate quantity of loans, rather than decrease as standard marginal pro-
ductivity arguments would suggest. The explanation is that investors’ optimal port-
folio composition typically changes as the amount of funds that is lent to them
varies, i.e., the ‘assets’ and ‘liabilities’ sides of investors’ balance-sheets are not in-
dependent. In certain circumstances, which we derive and explain in the paper, an
increase in investors’ liabilities may shift the composition of the portfolio in such
a way as to raise the ex ante return on loans. When this ‘portfolio composition’
effect is strong enough, it may dominate the usual ‘marginal productivity’ effect, so
that the expected return on loans increases with aggregate loans (at least for some
range of total loans). This strategic complementarity naturally leads to the existence
of multiple equilibria associated with different levels of aggregate lending, asset
prices, and output. We relate the intensity of these strategic complementarities, and
the resulting possibility of multiple equilibria, to the severity of the risk-shifting
problem in the economy.
We then consider the case where multiple equilibria do exist, and where the
selection of an equilibrium with low lending follows a ‘sunspot’, i.e., an extraneous
signal of any ex ante probability on which agents coordinate their expectations. We
show that such stochastic equilibria generate self-fulfilling crises with the follow-
ing characteristics; i) lending to portfolio investors drops off as lenders choose to
store, rather than lend, a large share of their endowment (credit contraction), ii) this
causes a fall in investors’ resources and a drop in their demand for fixed-supply
assets, whose price consequently falls to low levels (market crash), and iii) this fall
in prices forces into bankruptcy investors who had previously borrowed to buy as-
sets, as the new value of their assets falls short of their liabilities (financial sector
disruptions). In short, weak fundamentals make multiple equilibria possible, while
self-fulfilling expectations trigger the actual occurrence of the crisis. We also pro-
vide a full welfare analysis of the self-fulfilling crisis model. Crises are shown to
unambiguously decrease ex ante welfare, with a principal source of this welfare loss
being the negative wealth effects of the crash on lenders’ consumption.
The idea that financial crises naturally follow periods during which investors
use borrowed money to overinvest in risky assets can be traced back at least to
Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1975). Although our theory of financial crises draws on
recent related contributions, it also differs from them in a number of respects. While
Allen and Gale (2000) and Edison et al. (2000) both emphasise the interdependency
between asset price movements and aggregate credit during crises, they do so in the
framework of single-equilibrium models wherein crises are entirely explained by
exogenous fundamentals. Building on the empirical results of Kaminsky (1999)
discussed above, Chari and Kehoe (2003) account for crises which are unexplained
by fundamental factors by relying on investors’ ‘herd behaviour’ in an environment
with heterogenous information; in contrast, our results are derived within a rational
3
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expectations framework where all investors share the same information about asset
payoffs. There are at least two important classes of models that share with ours the
property that multiple equilibria occur only under weak fundamentals, while good
fundamentals ensure uniqueness. These are ‘second generation’ models of currency
crises (e.g., Obsfeld, 1994, 1996) and models of self-fulfilling debt crises (e.g., Cole
and Kehoe, 2000). Our framework differs from second generation (as well as ‘third
generation’, e.g., Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2001, 2004) models of currency
crises by focusing on the instability of aggregate credit, rather than on the volatility
of nominal exchange rates. With respect to debt crises models, our work stud-
ies the implications of the option to default on the part of financial intermediaries,
rather than the government. Finally, our model differs from infinite-horizon models
where self-fulfilling asset-price movements are the outcome of ‘steady state inde-
terminacy’, i.e., the multiplicity of converging perfect-foresight equilibrium paths
(as in Challe, 2004, for example).6
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces
the model and derives its unique frictionless (i.e., first-best efficient) equilibrium.
Section 3 shows how the interdependency between endogenous lending and the ex-
cessive risk-taking of portfolio investors may give rise to multiple equilibria associ-
ated with different levels of lending, asset prices, and output. Section 4 derives the
stochastic equilibria of this economy (i.e., equilibria featuring self-fulfilling crises)
and analyses their welfare properties, while Section 6 concludes. An Appendix col-
lects the proofs of the stated propositions as well as some robustness checks with
respect to changes in some of our baseline assumptions.
2 The model
2.1 Timing and assets
There are two dates, 1 and 2, and three real assets, labelled production, risky asset,
and international risk-free bond. Production yields f (x) units of the (all-purpose)
good at date 2 for x  0 units invested at date 1, where f (:) is a twice continu-
ously differentiable function satisfying f 0 (x)> 0; f 00 (x)< 0; f (0) = 0; f 0 (0) = ∞
and f 0 (∞) = 0. Moreover, the following standard assumption is made to limit the
6Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) offer a model of emerging country bubbles where the
bursting of the bubble is associated with a capital flow reversal. In their model, the existence of
bubbles is related to the relative scarcity of available stores of value (as in Tirole (1985)), while
our bubbles owe their existence to agency problems in the financial sector leading to excessive risk-
taking by investors.
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curvature of f (:), for all x> 0:
η (x) x f 00 (x)= f 0 (x)< 1: (1)
As will become clear below, agents operating the production technology
will finance themselves via the issuance of corporate bonds whose equilibrium rate
of return, the marginal product of capital f 0 (x), will vary with the amount of invest-
ment (due to the concavity of the production function).
The risky asset is in fixed supply (normalised to 1); it is available for pur-
chase at date 1 and delivers a terminal payoff R at date 2, where R is a random
variable at date 1 that takes on the value Rh with probability pi 2 (0;1] ; and 0 other-
wise, at date 2. Although more general distributions for the fundamental uncertainty
affecting the asset payoff can be considered, we choose this simple specification in
order to focus on the extrinsic uncertainty generated by the presence of multiple
equilibria. The market price of the risky asset at date 1, in terms of the good (which
is taken as the numeraire), is denoted by P1.
International risk-free bonds yield τy> 0 units of goods at date 2 for y units
invested at date 1. For expositional simplicity and with no loss of generality, it is
assumed that when agents are exactly indifferent between holding such bonds and
investing in other assets, then they invest in the other assets.7
The most direct interpretation of this menu of available assets is as fol-
lows. We think of “corporate bonds” and “risky assets” as domestic assets issued
by different sectors of the economy, with the supply of corporate bonds adjust-
ing more quickly than that of risky assets in the short run.8 Corporate bonds are
in imperfectly elastic supply in the sense that their rate of returns adjust follow-
ing changes for their demand, with equilibrium returns being lower when demand
is high than when demand is low. While we generate this feature via a produc-
tive entrepreneurial sector facing decreasing marginal returns (exactly as in Allen
and Gale, 2000), other mechanisms would produce a similar bond market equilib-
rium. For example, if domestic bonds are government bonds that are valued for
their liquidity and hence command a convenience yield, then the demand for such
bonds will be downward sloping in their price (see, for example, Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2010). If, in addition, this demand faces constant supply,
7In theory, holdings of international risk-free bonds should be indeterminate when their return
equals that on other assets. However, it turns out that this never occurs in equilibrium. Thus,
assuming from the onset that such holdings are zero in case of equal returns allows us to avoid
dealing with such virtual portfolios when deriving the optimal behaviour of individual agents.
8In our baseline specification, the supply of risky assets is fixed, but we check in the Appendix
that our results continue to hold when we explicitely introduce a sector that produces these assets,
provided that their supply is sufficiently less elastic than that of international risk-free bonds.
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then equilibrium bond returns will vary inversely with the demand for them, as it is
the case with our corporate bonds.
2.2 Agents and market structure
The economy consists of four types of risk neutral agents in large numbers, all max-
imising terminal consumption.9 There is a continuum of two-period lived lenders
of mass 1 who consume at date 2 and receive an endowment e1 at date 1 satisfying
e1 > f 0 1 (τ)+piRh=τ: (2)
As will become clear below, this technical assumption ensures that all the
equilibria that we analyse in the paper correspond to interior solutions, i.e., where
all three real assets are held in equilibrium.
Lenders face two-period lived investors and entrepreneurs with positive
mass who enter the market at date 1 and consume at date 2. Neither of them re-
ceive any endowment. Finally, the stock of risky assets is initially held by a class of
one-period lived initial asset holders, who sell them to investors at date 1 and then
leave the market.
There is market segmentation (i.e., restrictions on agents’ asset holdings)
in the following two senses. First, only entrepreneurs have access to the produc-
tion technology f (:); since they have no wealth of their own, they borrow funds
by issuing D1 bonds at date 1. Second, only investors have the asset management
ability necessary to trade corporate bonds and risky assets. Since lenders are ex-
cluded from these markets, they can only store or lend their funds to investors to
finance date 2 consumption; denoting lenders’ holdings of international risk-free
bonds by Q1 and their loans to investors by B1, we thus have Q1+B1  e1. Sim-
ilarly, since entrepreneurs do not engage in security trading, they can only invest
their borrowed funds into international risk-free bonds and productive investment;
denoting by QE1 and XS1 entrepreneurs’ holdings of international risk-free bonds and
productive investment, respectively, we have QE1 +XS1  D1. These assumptions
about market segmentation imply that the equilibrium at date 1 is partly intermedi-
ated, with lenders first entrusting investors with some of their savings (i.e., lending
B1), and then investors lending to entrepreneurs (i.e., buying D1 corporate bonds),
investing in risky assets (i.e., buying XR1 assets at price Pt), and possibly storing
the remainder, QI1 (so that XR1P1+D1+QI1  B1). For ease of presentation and
future reference, the flow of funds running from lenders to other agents at date 1 is
summarised in Figure 1.
9The paper focuses on the risk-neutral case, for which all results can be derived analytically. The
risk-averse case is briefly discussed in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Flow of funds
e1
Q1
B1
XR1P1
XS1
Lenders Investors
QI1
D1
QE1
Entrepreneurs
As we shall establish below, in general equilibrium investors and entrepre-
neurs strictly prefer to invest all their borrowed resources where they hold a com-
parative advantage (asset trading and production, respectively) and thus never find
it worthwhile to hold international risk-free bonds. Thus, although we will have
QI1 = QE1 = 0 in equilibrium (and hence XS1 = D1 and XR1P1+XS1 = B1), this will
reflect agents’ optimal portfolio choice, rather than exogenous restrictions on their
access to the market for international risk-free bonds.
We think of our investors as being private, highly leveraged financial insti-
tutions that operate directly in the financial markets, such as investment banks and
hedge funds. They may also include commercial banks or other leveraged inter-
mediaries, to the extent that they engage in security trading as a secondary activity
or hold loans whose recovery rate is tied to fluctuating asset prices (for example,
collateralised mortgages). The key difference between such institutions and non-
leveraged investors (like households or insurance companies) is that limited liability
on the liability side coupled with market risk on the asset side may force the former
into bankruptcy in case of bad asset performance, leaving lenders with the residual
value of assets.10 To allow for the possibility of investor default, we follow Allen
and Gale (2000) in assuming that lenders and investors use simple debt contracts,
where the contracted rate on these loans, rl1; cannot be conditional on the loan size
or, due to asymmetric information, the investor’s portfolio. As we show below, the
10Leveraged investors played a central role in the run up to the subprime mortgage crisis. Ac-
cording to Greenlaw et al. (2008, p. 25), US and foreign-based leveraged intermediaries accounted
for about two thirds of the total exposure to subprime mortgage risk. The growing share of risky
assets held by leveraged investors in recent years is documented in International Monetary Fund
(2008, ch. 2). See also Adrian and Shin (2007) for evidence on the procyclical behaviour of these
intermediaries.
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use of debt contracts with limited liability causes lenders’ and investors’ incentives
to be misaligned, with investors taking riskier asset positions than lenders would if
they had direct access to all investment opportunities. Note that the distorting effect
of debt financing (as opposed to equity financing) for value-maximising decisions,
and the resulting excess risk-taking that may ensue, has been well understood at
least since the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976). While we do not seek to pro-
vide a fully microfounded account of the use of debt contracts here, which would
be well beyond the scope of this paper, we find it helpful to think of them as orig-
inating from a “double moral hazard” problem of the type analysed by Biais and
Casamatta (1999), among others. Imagine, for example, that an investor’s payoff
depends not only on the riskiness of his chosen portfolio but also on his asset man-
agement effort, both of which are concealed to the lenders. To elicit high effort, the
efficient contract must reward the investor generously when the payoff is high. A
simple debt contract fulfils this purpose (by letting the borrower capture all of the
payoff in excess of the due debt repayments), even though it may lead the investor
to hold a riskier portfolio that in the first-best case.11
Although risk shifting arises from the use of debt contracts in our model, it is
worth stressing that other well-known market distortions are likely to generate sim-
ilar incentive problems. For example, it is frequently argued that the compensation
schemes enjoyed by money managers, often characterised by a convex reward struc-
ture, lead them to take excessively risky asset positions.12 At the macroeconomic
level, explicit or implicit government guarantees have also often been blamed for
leading investors to select their portfolio on the basis of the upper end of the payoff
distribution, in the expectation that any large loss incurred in the case of bad payoff
outcomes will be socialised.13 We thus think of the limited liability nature of debt
contracts as one amongst a number of factors potentially leading to excessive risk
taking by investors.
11A related point is made by Barlevy (2008), who showed that simple debt contracts involving risk
shifting may be optimal when lenders can not distinguish speculative investors from well-behaved
entrepreneurs.
12See Chevalier and Ellison (1997) for an empirical study of how incentives affect risk taking
by fund managers, and Palomino and Prat (2005), as well as the references therein, for models of
investor risk taking under portfolio delegation.
13Explicit government guarantees include those enjoyed by capital inflows into some South East
Asian countries prior to the 1997 crisis (see Corsetti et al., 1999). Implicit guaranties also lead
to expectations of bail out that can reasonably be qualified as rational. In the sole case of the
subprime mortgage crisis, most distressed banks have received direct or indirect public support
aimed at avoiding ex post bankrupcy.
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2.3 Frictionless equilibrium
In the intermediated economy described above, entrepreneurs are granted exclusive
access to the production technology while only investors can trade risky assets and
corporate bonds. Before analysing the resulting market outcome in more detail, it
is useful to first derive the equilibrium that would prevail without these frictions,
i.e., if households were able to directly invest in all assets. The corresponding
frictionless equilibrium, in which prices and quantities are first-best efficient, will
provide a natural benchmark against which the intermediated equilibrium can be
compared.14
In this equilibrium, households freely allocate their endowment e1 across
the three real assets available. Using the superscript F to index the frictionless
equilibrium, households choose productive investment, XFS1, risky asset holdings,
XFR1, and holdings of risk-free bonds, QF1 ; so as to maximise expected terminal
consumption, taking the price of the risky asset, PF1 , as given. The lenders’ objective
is thus:
maxE
 
τQF1 + f
 
XFS1

+XFR1R

s.t. XFS1+X
F
R1P
F
1 +QF1  e1;
XFS1;X
F
R1;F
F
1  0;
were expectations are conditional on the information set at date 1. Substituting the
first constraint into the objective and rearranging, the lenders’ problem becomes:
maxe1τ+XFR1

piRh  τPF1

+ f  XFS1  τXFS1: (3)
From equation (3), no-arbitrage considerations imply that the value of the
asset in the frictionless equilibrium must be:
PF1 = piR
h=τ: (4)
The return to international risk-free bonds, τ , is the opportunity cost of hold-
ing risky assets, and thus the rate at which expected dividend payments, piRh, are
discounted. Were PF1 to be greater than piRh=τ; then the gross return on trading as-
sets, piRh=PF1 , would be lower than the return on risk-free bonds, τ; for all positive
values of XFR1; no lender would be willing to buy the risky asset, which would drive
14We refer to the equilibrium without market segmentation as the “frictionless” equilibrium, rather
than the “fundamental” equilibrium, the term that Allen and Gale (2000) use in their original paper.
This is because the frictionless equilibrium is a theoretical benchmark that can actually not prevail
under market segmentation.
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its price down to zero and its expected return up to infinity. On the other hand, were
PF1 to be smaller than piRh=τ; then the gross return piRh=PF1 would be higher than
τ for all positive values of XFR1; lenders would all compete to buy the risky asset
only and would bid up its price until PF1  piRh=τ: Thus, neither PF1 < piRh=τ nor
PF1 > piR
h=τ can be equilibrium situations. Then, choosing XFS1 to maximise (3)
gives:
XFS1 = f 0 1 (τ) : (5)
For future reference and comparison with the intermediated equilibrium, we
denote by BF1 the total amount of funds invested in production and risky assets in
the frictionless equilibrium. We have:
BF1 = f 0 1 (τ)+piRh=τ; (6)
while the implied holdings of international risk-free bonds, QF1 = e1 BF1 , is posi-
tive by assumption (2).
3 Endogenous lending and multiple equilibria
This Section computes the intermediated equilibrium, i.e., where households no
longer have direct access to the markets for risky assets and corporate bonds. First,
entrepreneurs’ and investors’ optimal decisions are used to compute the market-
clearing asset-price vector (P1,r1) conditional on aggregate lending, B1 (Section
3.1). Second, lenders’ ex ante return on their loans to investors is derived, given
this price vector and the possibility that investors default at date 2 (Section 3.2).
Third, the loan return curve, and the implied lenders’ choices, determine aggregate
lending and asset prices in equilibrium (Section 3.3). Finally, the main properties
of the intermediated equilibrium are discussed (Sections 3.4 and 3.5).
3.1 Market clearing
3.1.1 Corporate investment and corporate bond rate
In the intermediated equilibrium, entrepreneurs borrow D1 unit of funds at date 1
and turn these funds into real investment, XS1, and international risk-free bonds, QE1
(see Figure 1). They thus solve:
max f (XS1)+ τQE1   r1D1
=max f (XS1)  r1XS1+QE1 (τ  r1) ;
s.t. XS1;QE1  0;
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where r1 is the gross interest rate on (domestic) corporate bonds. No-arbitrage
considerations indicate that we must have that r1  τ and thus QE (τ  r1) = 0. If
r1< τ then entrepreneurs would be willing to issue infinitely many bonds and invest
the proceeds abroad; they would hit the limit of available funds in the economy
(since the aggregate endowment, e1, is finite), and from this point would compete
for loans until r1  τ . Then, if r1  τ , the return on international risk-free bonds
is strictly less than, or equal to, the corporate bond rate and entrepreneurs choose
QE1 = 0 (recall that agents do not store when the net return on doing so is zero).
Thus, the solution to entrepreneurs’ portfolio choice is such that D1 = XS1 and
f 0 (XS1) = r1  τ: (7)
3.1.2 Contracted loan rate
Investors borrow B1 ( 0) from the lenders, which they use to buy XS1 corporate
bonds, XR1 units of the risky asset (at price P1), and possibly to store the remainder,
QI1. The use of debt contracts with limited liability allows investors to default, and
earn 0, when their total payoff at date 2, r1XS1+RXR1+τQI1; is less than the amount
owed to lenders, rl1B1. Their terminal consumption, conditional on the risky asset’s
payoff R, is thus:15
max
h
r1XS1+RXR1+ τQI1  rl1B1;0
i
;
s.t. XS1+P1XR1+QI1  B1;
XS1;XR1;QIR1  0:
Using the first constraint and rearranging, we can write investors’ consump-
tion as:
max
h
XS1

r1  rl1

+XR1

R  rl1P1

+QI1

τ  rl1

;0
i
:
A no-arbitrage argument similar to that used to characterise the behaviour
of entrepreneurs allows us to infer that rl1  τ (otherwise investors would want to
borrow an unlimited amount of funds to buy international risk-free bonds), and thus
QI1 = 0. It must also be the case that the contracted rate on loans between lenders
and investors, rl1, be equal to the interest rate on corporate bonds, r1. If r1 > rl1,
then investors would want to borrow an unlimited amount of funds from the lenders
15Our formulation for investors’ objective reflects the simplifying assumption that they have no
equity. It can be shown that our results are unchanged provided that investors’ equity is sufficiently
small, while the intermediated equilibrium is identical to the frictionless one when the amount of
equity is large. This is why we interpret our investors as highly-leveraged intermediaries –see our
our discussion in Section 2.2.
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and use them to buy corporate bonds; they would then reach the finite limit of
available funds, and from then on compete for loans until r1 = rl1. If r1 < rl1 then
investors’ loan demand would be zero, so that the return on corporate bonds would
be r1 = f 0 (0) = ∞; a contradiction. Thus, any equilibrium in the markets for loans
and corporate bonds must satisfy rl1 = r1 = f 0 (XS1). At this loan rate, perfect com-
petition amongst investors drives down the net return on trading corporate bonds to
zero.
3.1.3 Asset prices and interest rate
Since XS1
 
r1  rl1

+QI1
 
τ  rl1

= 0; investors’ terminal consumption is simply
max[XR1(R  r1P1);0]: Because XR1 (0  r1P1) < 0 for all P1 > 0; investors default
on loans when the asset payoff is 0, and this occurs with probability 1 pi . Their
expected date 2 consumption is thus piXR1
 
Rh  r1P1

, provided they do not default
when the asset payoff is Rh (i.e., provided XR1
 
Rh  r1P1

is non-negative, as is
always the case in equilibrium). Given their objective of maximising expected ter-
minal consumption, market clearing for the risky asset implies that its equilibrium
price is:
P1 = Rh=r1: (8)
Were the price of the asset to be lower (higher) than Rh=r1; then Rh  r1P1
would be positive (negative) for all positive values of XR1 and investors would want
to buy infinitely many (zero) risky assets. Notice from (8) that investors’ consump-
tion when R = Rh is XR1
 
Rh  r1P1

= 0. The reason for this is intuitive: because
markets are competitive, investors must make zero expected profits on trading risky
assets. Since they earn zero when R= 0 and they default, they must also earn zero
when R = Rh, which is exactly ensured by the equilibrium price in (8). Thus, in
equilibrium the terminal consumption of investors is zero under both possible val-
ues of R at date 2.
Using equation (8) and the fact that in equilibrium XR1 = 1, QI1 = QE1 = 0
and r1 = f 0 (XS1) ; we have r1 = f 0 (B1 P1). Market clearing for corporate bonds
then implies:
f 0 1 (r1)+Rh=r1 = B1: (9)
From the hypothesised properties of f (:), equation (9) uniquely defines the
equilibrium interest rate for all positive values of B1: The implied interest rate func-
tion, r1 (B1) ; is continuous and such that r01 (B1) < 0, r1 (0) = ∞ and r1 (∞) = 0.
Equations (8)–(9) then fully characterise the intermediated equilibrium price vector
at date 1, (P1;r1); conditional on the amount of aggregate lending, B1.
Note from (6) and (9) that at the point B1 = BF1 the intermediated interest
rate, r1 (B1), is greater than its frictionless analogue, τ . This can be explained as
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follows. For a given value of B1; the expected asset payoff that accrues to investors
in the intermediated equilibrium, Rh, is higher than the expected payoff to lenders
in the frictionless equilibrium, piRh. In consequence, risky assets are bid up in the
intermediated equilibrium and safe asset investment, XS1; is crowded out, which in
turn raises the equilibrium interest rate, r1 (relative to the interest rate prevailing in
the frictionless equilibrium, τ). The intermediated equilibrium is thus characterised
by risk shifting, in the sense that portfolio delegation to debt-financed investors
leads to an excessive share of risky asset investment, and too little safe asset in-
vestment, relative to the efficient portfolio (i.e., the frictionless equilibrium). The
implications of this distortion for equilibrium asset prices and savings are further
analysed in Section 3.4.
3.2 Expected return on loans
Given lenders’ utility function, individual lending decisions at date 1 depend on the
expected return on the loans they make to investors, denoted by ρ1; as compared to
the certain return they receive from holding international risk-free bonds, τ . Note
that in general ρ1 differs from the contracted loan rate, rl1 = r1, because of the
possibility that investors will default on loans at date 2.
When investors do not default on loans (i.e., when R = Rh), the contracted
loan rate applies and they repay lenders r1B1. When they do default, lenders col-
lect the residual value of investors’ portfolio, i.e., the capitalised value of cor-
porate bonds, r1XS1 = r1 (B1 P1) : The ex ante unit loan return is thus pir1 +
(1 pi)r1 (1 P1=B1) or, using (8) and the interest rate function r1 (B1) defined by
(9),
ρ1 (B1) = r1 (B1) 
(1 pi)Rh
B1
(> 0) : (10)
Note from equations (5), (9) and (10) that the probability that investors be-
come bankrupt at date 2, 1 pi , indexes the gap between the contracted and actual
ex ante returns on savings, r1 and ρ1. When pi = 1 the risk-shifting problem disap-
pears since portfolio investors never default; the intermediated loan return, ρ1 (B1) ;
is then identical to the contracted loan rate, r1 (B1) ;which in turn equals the interest
rate in the frictionless equilibrium, τ . When pi < 1; investors’ and lenders’ incen-
tives become misaligned, and a gap (1 pi)Rh=B1 > 0 appears between r1 and ρ1.
Thus, 1 pi measures both the severity of the risk-shifting problem in the economy
(i.e., the extent to which investors take more risk than if they were playing with
their own funds) and the implied distortion in the intermediated return on loans
(i.e., r1 ρ1).
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The first term of the right-hand side of (10), r1 (B1), is the (decreasing) in-
terest rate function defined by equation (9): an increase in B1 raises the amount
invested in the safe asset, XS1, which reduces the equilibrium interest rate, r1 =
f 0 (XS1) ; and thus the average return on loans; this is the usual ‘marginal produc-
tivity effect’ of aggregate savings on the loan return. In contrast, the second term,
 (1 pi)Rh=B1; increases with B1; this latter effect reflects the impact of the total
loan amount on the average riskiness of loans as the composition of the optimal
portfolio varies with B1. To analyse this second effect in more detail, first use (9)
to write the relationship between safe asset investment, XS1; and aggregate lending,
B1, as follows:
B1 = XS1+Rh= f 0 (XS1) : (11)
From (11) and assumption (1) regarding the concavity of f (:), it is easy
to check that an increase in B1 raises both the quantity of safe assets, XS1, and
the share of safe asset investment in investors’ portfolio, XS1=B1 (i.e., it lowers
B1=XS1= 1+Rh=XS1 f 0 (XS1)). In other words, even though an increase in B1 lowers
r1 and thus raises asset prices, Rh=r1, the relative size of risky asset investment,
P1=B1 = 1 XS1=B1; decreases as B1 increases. This ‘portfolio composition effect’
in turn limits the loss to lenders in the case of investors’ default and raises the ex
ante return on loans.
Given these two effects, the crucial question is: Are there intervals of B1
over which ρ1 (B1) may be increasing, i.e., where the portfolio composition effect
dominates the marginal productivity effect? To obtain some insight into the con-
ditions under which this is the case, solve (9) for Rh and substitute the resulting
expression into (10) to obtain:
ρ1 (B1) = r1 (B1)(pi+(1 pi)(XS1=B1)) : (12)
Both effects are made explicit in (12). Intuitively, for the increase in XS1=B1
to dominate the decrease in r1 (B1) induced by a marginal increase in B1, 1 pi must
be sufficiently large (i.e., the risk-shifting problem must be sufficiently severe), and
 r01 (B1)(> 0) must be not too large (i.e., the marginal productivity effect must be
sufficiently weak). When this is the case, ‘strategic complementarities’ (in the sense
of Cooper and John, 1988) in lending decisions appear, as a symmetric decision by
other lenders to increase their loans to investors leads any individual lender to do the
same. Proposition 1 formally establishes the conditions for such complementarities
to occur in the general case, as well as for a more specific class of production
functions.
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B1, provided pi and   f 00 (x) are not too large. In the isoelastic case where
f (x) = x1 η=(1 η), η 2 (0;1), ρ1 (B1) has exactly one (zero) increasing
interval if 2η+
p
pi < ()1:
For a general function f (:), there may be several intervals of B1 over which
ρ1 (B1) is increasing, i.e., over which the implied   f 00 (XS1) is sufficiently small
(provided pi is not too large). In the isoelastic case, a high value of η increases
the curvature of f (:) and strengthens the marginal productivity effect; thus, neither
pi nor η must be too large for the portfolio composition effect to dominate the
marginal productivity effect.
Our only motivation for distinguishing the isoelastic case in Proposition 1
is because it produces a closed form existence condition that clearly shows the
joint role of the curvature of the production function and the payoff probabilities
in generating strategic complementarities. One must nevertheless bear in mind that
the isoelastic case produces nonmonotonic loan return functions only for rather
extreme parameter values. For example, assuming that the production function also
uses entrepreneurs’ labour and that the latter is in fixed supply normalised to one,
matching a realistic capital share would require setting η = 1=3; in this case, the
condition 2η+
p
pi < 1 would be satisfied only for pi < 1=9. Alternatively, setting
the probability of success to higher values would require a lower value of η , thereby
raising the capital share to implausible levels. This feature follows from the fact
that the isoelastic case has a single parameter, η , indexing both the curvature of the
production function and income shares. Fortunately, this restriction is not shared by
many other production functions (even though no closed-form conditions could be
derived for these). As an example of this, assume that the production function uses
entrepreneurs labour (in fixed supply one), has constant returns to scale, satisfies
Inada conditions at the boundaries, but has constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
between inputs over a sufficiently large range, i.e.,
f (x) =

ax
ι 1
ι +1 a
 ι
ι 1 for x 2 [X ; ¯X ] (0;∞) ;
with a 2 (0;1) being the income share parameter and ι 2 (0;∞) the elasticity of
substitution between the two inputs. The isoelastic case is recovered as ι ! 1 (in
which case a= 1 η). The difference with the isoelastic case is that the curvature of
f (:), as measured by   f 00 (:) ; may be decreased by raising ι , whilst the parameter
a is independently set at a a value that is consistent with observed income shares.
In the limit, as ι ! ∞ we have f 0 (XS1)! a and f 00 (XS1)! 0 for XS1 2 [X ; ¯X ].
Proposition 1 (Strategic complementarities). The loan return curve, ρ1 (B1),
which satisfies ρ1 (0) = ∞ and ρ1 (∞) = 0, is non-monotonic in total loans,
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Moreover, equation (11) implies that XS1! B1 Rh=a, so that the relevant capital
share goes to
f 0 (XS1)XS1
f (XS1) !
a
a+(1 a)X 1S1
= a

a+
1 a
B1 Rh=a
 1
:
Hence in the CES case the capital share, as indexed by a, is no longer tied to
the curvature of f (:), which is (mostly) indexed by ι . Nonmonotonicity will arise
for high values of ι , while a realistic capital share can be matched by appropriately
setting a, given B1 and Rh.16
In the remainder of the paper, we shall leave f (:) unrestricted (except for
the basic restrictions imposed in Section 2.1) and focus on a particularly simple case
of non-monotonicity by assuming that ρ1 (B1) has one single increasing interval, as
depicted in Figure 2. All of our results generalise straightforwardly to the case of
multiple increasing intervals.
3.3 Loan market equilibrium
Having characterised the ex ante loan return, ρ1, as a function of the amount of
aggregate loans, B1, we may now analyse the way the latter is determined in equi-
librium. At date 1, lenders choose the individual level of loans, ˆB1, and individual
holdings of international risk-free bonds, ˆQ1, to maximise expected terminal con-
sumption, taking ρ1 = ρ1 (B1) as given. Given the lenders’ objective, they find it
worthwhile increasing (decreasing) their loans to investors whenever ρ1 > (<)τ .
Any interior equilibrium must thus satisfy ρ1 = τ . We focus on symmetric Nash
equilibria, where asset holding plans are symmetric across lenders (i.e., ˆB1 = B1)
and no lender finds it worthwhile to individually alter his own plan. The following
proposition naturally follows.
Proposition 2 (Multiple equilibria). Assume that ρ1 (B1) has one increasing
interval. Then there exist τ  > 0 and τ+ > τ  such that if τ 2 (0;τ ][
[τ+;∞) then the model has a unique stable, interior equilibrium, while if τ 2
(τ ;τ+) then the model has two stable, interior equilibria Bl1 2 (0;e1) and
Bh1 2
 
Bl1;e1

.
16Of course, B1 is endogenously given in equilibrium and potentially subject to multiple equi-
libria, as we argue below. This implies that, given (s;a), the high lending equilibrium will have a
higher capital share than an equilibrium with lower aggregate loans.
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Figure 2: Loan market equilibrium
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Total loans
In short, Proposition 2 states that, given a non-monotonic loan return curve,
multiplicity occurs when the return on international risk-free bonds takes interme-
diate values, while uniqueness prevails when this return is either sufficiently high
(in which case only low lending is possible) or sufficiently low (in which case only
high lending results). Figure 2 displays the case where τ 2 (τ ;τ+), i.e., where the
τ-line intersects the ρ1 (B1)-curve more than once.
Recall from equation (11) that an increase in B1 lowers marginal produc-
tivity but also reduces the share of risky assets in investors’ portfolios. The low-
lending equilibrium is thus characterised by a higher interest rate r1 but also a
greater share of risky assets in the portfolio, while the high-lending equilibrium
is characterised by a lower interest rate but a safer average portfolio. Finally, no-
tice that even though both equilibria yield the same ex ante return on loans, τ , they
are always associated with different levels of interest rates, asset prices, productive
investment, and (expected) date 2 output: equation (9) and the fact that Bh1 > Bl1
implies that r1(Bh)< r1(Bl): Then, denoting the asset’s price by P j1 and productive
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investment by X jS1 when total lending is B
j
1, we have:
Ph1 = R
h=r1(Bh)> Pl1 = R
h=r1(Bl);
and
XhS1 = f 0 1

r1(Bh1)

> XlS1 = f 0 1

r1(Bl1)

:
In short, the selection of the low-lending equilibrium raises the interest rate
and depresses asset prices and productive investment, relative to the equilibrium
with high lending. (More generally, there may be more than two stable equilibria
if ρ1 (B1) has more than one increasing interval, but their properties are similar to
the 2-equilibrium case, i.e., the higher is B1, the lower is r1(B1), and the higher are
P1, XS1 and E1 (Y )). Finally, note that in the high-lending equilibrium the aggregate
endowment is more invested in risky assets than in the low lending equilibrium (i.e.,
the ratio of risky asset to safe assets, P j1=(e1 P j1 ), is higher when j = h than when
j = h.)
3.4 Comparison with the frictionless equilibrium
We emphasised above that the risk-shifting problem arising under market segmen-
tation leads investors to overinvest in risky assets, relative to the frictionless equi-
librium. Proposition 3 summarises the implications of this distortion for the price
of the risky asset and the amount of aggregate saving and productive investment in
equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Asset bubbles and crowding out). In both intermediated equilib-
ria, asset prices are higher than in the frictionless equilibrium (i.e., Ph1 > Pl1 >
PF1 ), while aggregate lending and productive investment are lower than their
frictionless analogues (i.e., Bl1 < Bh1 < BF1 and XlS1 < XhS1 < XFS1).
That P j1 > PF1 ; j = l;h; indicates that assets are overpriced at date 1 in both
intermediated equilibria, i.e., both equilibria are associated with a positive bubble
in asset prices (the bubble being larger, the larger is aggregate credit). Because
investors are protected against a bad value of the asset payoff by the use of simple
debt contracts, they bid up the asset and consequently raise its price and its share in
equilibrium portfolios (relative to the frictionless equilibrium).
The reason why savings are lower in both intermediated equilibria than in
the frictionless equilibrium (i.e., Bl1 < Bh1 < BF1 ) follows naturally: excessive risky-
asset investment by portfolio investors implies that at B1 = BF1 the intermediated
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ex ante loan return, ρ1 (B1), is lower than the frictionless return, τ . Lenders thus
optimally raise their holdings of risk-free bonds in the intermediated equilibrium
(relative to the frictionless equilibrium) up to the point where the intermediated and
the frictionless returns are equal. Note that, as a consequence, a double crowd-
ing out effect is in fact at work on XS1 in the intermediated equilibrium. First, at
B1 = BF1 bubbly asset prices crowd out safe asset investment, XS1, which raises the
equilibrium interest rate, r1 = f 0 (XS1). Second, lenders’ optimal reaction to the re-
sulting price distortion is to reduce B1 below BF1 , which lowers XS1 (and raises r1)
even further.
3.5 Comparative statics and threshold effects
Our analysis thus far has focused on the existence conditions and properties of
multiple equilibria. Proposition 4 below summarises how the deep parameters of
the model affect the loan return curve and, by implication, which equilibrium(a)
may be expected to prevail.
Proposition 4 (Effect of fundamental risk). An increase in fundamental risk,
in the form of either a higher default probability (i.e., an increase in 1 
pi holding Rh fixed) or a higher mean preserving spread in the risky asset’s
payoff (i.e., a higher value of 1 pi holding piRh fixed), lowers the whole loan
return curve, ρ1 (B1).
Proposition 4 summarises how changes in aggregate risk shape the loan re-
turn curve and affect the existence of the lending equilibria depicted in Figure 2.
When the loan return curve is monotonic, a unique equilibrium necessarily pre-
vails, so the small changes in fundamentals considered in the Proposition have a
small (i.e., continuous) impact on outcomes. The situation is very different under
nonmonotonicity. More specifically, for any given value of τ , the low-lending equi-
librium Bl1 is all the more likely to exist, either jointly with the high-lending equilib-
rium Bh1 or as a unique equilibrium, as fundamental risk –as defined in Proposition
4– rises; conversely, the high lending equilibrium is all the more likely to exist (ei-
ther in isolation or jointly with the low-lending equilibrium) as fundamental risk
falls. Note that what matters here is not the location of the ρ1 (B1)-curve per se but
its location relative to that of the τ-line. Similar statements can thus be made about
changes in τ , holding the ρ1 (B1)-curve fixed: the high- (low-) lending equilibrium
is all the more likely to exist when τ is low (high).
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Although a proper analysis of booms and busts cycles would require a fully
dynamic extension of the model, it is nevertheless instructive to explore some impli-
cations of the comparative statics properties just derived in an economy where the
two-period sequence analysed so far were to repeat itself over time.17 Assume that
the loan return curve is nonmonotonic, and imagine a situation where fundamental
risk is initially low, and the implied ρ1 (B1)-curve sufficiently high, to ensure the
prevalence of a unique equilibrium with high lending –see the solid line in the left
panel of Figure 3. Now suppose that fundamental risk (i.e., 1 pi) starts increasing,
causing the ρ1 (B1)-curve to shift downwards. At some point, a second, low-lending
equilibrium appears and the initial equilibrium becomes exposed to lenders’ panic,
even though it may still prevail for some time if no drastic change of expectations
occurs (the upper dotted line). If fundamentals continue to worsen, however, the
high equilibrium vanishes and a sudden, discontinuous equilibrium change from
high to low lending –a credit and asset market crash– is bound to occur (the lower
dotted line). A similar jump may occur through a gradual increase in τ , holding
fundamental risk constant –see the left panel of Figure 3. If τ is sufficiently low,
only high lending is possible; as τ increases, a separate, low-lending equilibrium
appears, and only the low equilibrium will finally exit as τ continues to rise. In
contrast, small changes in fundamentals cannot have large impact on outcomes in
the absence of strategic complementarities.
Figure 3: Threshold effects
B1
ρ1(B1)
t
t
Increase in fundamental risk (p æ)
Initial equilibrium
Final equilibrium
Increase in the riskless rate (t ä)
ρ1(B1)
Initial equilibrium
Final equilibrium
B1
17see Gennotte and Leland (1990) for a similar approach.
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We find these crash scenarios helpful in interpreting the sudden deleverag-
ing of the U.S. financial sector during the subprime mortgage crisis.18 The years
preceding the crisis were times of historically low interest rates, fostered by high
world savings (notably from China and oil-exporting countries) and a particularly
accommodative monetary policy from the Federal Reserve over most of the period.
At the same time, low global inflation and sustained GDP growth, both in the U.S.
and across the world, reduced macroeconomic uncertainty and thus the perceived
risk associated with holding large classes of assets –including residential property
and the securitised loans that had financed their purchase. As we have just argued,
both factors are conducive to high lending fuelled by limited default risk (that is, a
high ρ (B1)-curve) and low world riskless rates (i.e., a low τ-line).
While market participants took some time before fully realising the extent
of the increased default risk, the market became aware of it at the latest in early July
2007 (Greenlaw et al., 2008). In our model, the worsening of perceived risk condi-
tions and rising world interest rates translate into a downward shift in the ρ1 (B1)-
curve and an upward shift in the τ-line, both of which, as we have argued, are likely
to lead to financial fragility. At some point, the gradual evolution of fundamentals
may have made the high-lending equilibrium unsustainable, ultimately triggering a
jump to the low lending equilibrium associated with lower intermediaries’ leverage
as well as lower asset prices and investment.
4 Self-fulfilling financial crises
The previous section has shown that the risk shifting problem that arises under
market intermediation may lead, under endogenous lending, to the existence of
multiple equilibria associated with different levels of aggregate lending, interest
rates, and asset prices. We now expand the time span of the model to demonstrate
the possibility of a self-fulfilling financial crisis associated with the selection of
the low-lending equilibrium at date 1 (Section 4.1). Besides offering a stochastic
version of the multiple equilibria model, the self-fulfilling crisis model has two
important implications. First, it generates endogenous bankruptcies in equilibrium,
as the selection of the low-lending/low-asset price equilibrium at the intermediate
date causes the assets of initially levered investors to fall short of their liabilities
(Section 4.2). Second, it uncovers some of the negative welfare consequences of
crises working through the wealth effects of the crash on lenders’ consumption
(Section 4.3).
18Because our model assumes rational expections and full information, it cannot adequately cap-
ture the fact that market participants misperceived the risk associated with holding risky assets,
admittedly another key ingredient in the build-up of financial fragility leading to the subprime crisis.
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4.1 The three-date model
The model has now three dates, 0, 1 and 2. Lenders live for 3 periods, maximise
terminal consumption, and receive the endowment e0 > 0 at date 0 (in addition
to receiving e1 at date 1). They face overlapping generations of two-period lived
investors and entrepreneurs entering the economy at dates 0 and 1. In the following,
we shall refer to ‘date t investors (entrepreneurs)’ as the investors (entrepreneurs)
who enter the economy at date t, t = 0;1, and leave it at date t+1. The risky asset
is now assumed to be three-period lived – it is sold by the one-period lived initial
asset holders at date 0 and delivers its final payoff at date 2. The production lag is
of one period as before, with XSt units of productive investment at date t, t = 0;1,
yielding f (XSt) units of good at date t+1. Finally, we assume for simplicity that the
market for international risk-free bonds is only open from date 1 to date 2.19 These
assumptions are meant to ensure that the intermediate date of the three-date model
exhibits exactly the same equilibrium levels of lending as the initial date of the two-
period model; we can then straightforwardly work backwards the equilibrium at
date 0, given the possible outcomes at date 1 and the likelihood that they occur.
Crisis equilibria are constructed by randomising over the two possible lend-
ing equilibria that may prevail at date 1. More specifically, assume that, from the
point of view of date 0, high lending is selected with probability p2 (0;1) at date 1,
so that the ‘sunspot’ on which agents coordinate their expectations causes lending
and asset prices to drop down to low levels with probability 1  p. It is assumed that
at date 0 all agents share the same prior about 1  p, and that the latter is consistent
with the true probability that the crisis signal will occur at date 1 (the three-date
model thus potentially has a continuum of stochastic equilibria indexed by the ex
ante probability of a market crash, 1  p). Since the asset’s price at date 1 is the
asset payoff accruing to date 0 investors, this uncertainty about asset prices creates
a risk-shifting problem at date 0 similar to that created at date 1 by the intrinsic un-
certainty about the asset’s terminal payoff. This causes the asset to be bid up at date
0, with the possibility that a self-fulfilling crisis (i.e., a drop in asset prices forcing
date 0 investors into bankruptcy) occurs if the low lending equilibrium is selected.
19Our results can be generalised to the situation where this market is also open from date 0 to
date 1, but the full analysis of this case requires substantial algebra without significantly altering our
results. Under this generalisation, if the self-fulfilling uncertainty that plagues asset prices at date 1
is sufficiently strong, then it may generate multiple equilibria at date 0 –in the same way as strong
fundamental uncertainty at date 2 may generate multiple equilibria at date 1. Assuming that storage
is not available at date 0 amounts to ruling out this additional source of equilibrium multiplicity.
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4.2 Date 0 equilibrium
4.2.1 Contracted loan rate
Denote by (P0, r0) the equilibrium asset price vector, rl0 the contracted loan rate,
and (XS0;XR0) the portfolio of date 0 investors. Date 0 entrepreneurs receive f (XS0)
units of goods at date 1 from investing XS0 in the production technology at date 0,
so their optimal investment choice is such that r0 = f 0 (XS0). On the other hand, the
limited liability of date 0 investors and the portfolio constraint B0 = XS0+ P0XS0
imply that their terminal consumption (i.e., at date 1) is:
max
h
r0XS0+P1XR0  rl0B0;0
i
=max
h
XR0 (P1  r0P0)+B0

r0  rl0

;0
i
;
where, given our assumption about exogenous uncertainty, P1 is a random variable
at date 0, taking on the value Ph1 with probability p (i.e., Bh1 is selected), and Pl1
otherwise (Bl1 is selected). The loan rate rl0 must be equal to the rate on corporate
bonds r0: were rl0 to be lower (higher) than r0, then investors would want to borrow
infinitely many (zero) units of goods to buy bonds, while the loan supply at date
0 is exactly e0 (the expected return on loans at date 0 is non-negative, because the
liquidation value of date 0 portfolios cannot be negative). Thus, any equilibrium
must satisfy rl0 = r0 = f 0 (XS0) and B0 = e0.
4.2.2 Asset prices and interest rate
In the equilibria that we are considering, date 0 investors default on loans when
the asset price at date 1 is Pl1, but not when it is Ph1 . Since B0
 
r0  rl0

= 0; their
terminal consumption is XR0
 
Ph1   r0P0
  0 with probability p and 0 otherwise.
Date 0 investors choose the level of XR0 that maximises expected consumption,
pXR0
 
Ph1   r0P0

, while any potential solution to their decision problem must be
such that they do not default on loans if the asset price at date 1 is Ph1 , but do default
if it is Pl1, i.e.,
Ph1   r0P0  0; Pl1  r0P0 < 0: (13)
The demand for risky assets by date 0 investors, XR0; is infinite (zero) if
Ph1   r0P0 > 0(< 0) :Market clearing thus requires that the equilibrium price of the
risky asset be:
P0 = Ph1 =r0; (14)
which satisfies both inequalities in (13). Again, the interpretation of this equilib-
rium price is straightforward. Perfect competition for the risky asset by date 0
investors implies an asset price such that they make zero expected profit. Because
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they make zero profit from holding risky assets when the asset payoff is Pl1 (i.e.,
when they default), they must also earn zero when it is Ph1 ; this is exactly what the
equilibrium price Ph1 =r0 ensures.
Aggregate lending from date 0 to date 1 is e0. In equilibrium we have XR0 =
1 and r0 = f 0 (XS0) = f 0 (e0 P0). Thus, r0 is uniquely determined by the following
equation:
f 0 1 (r0)+Ph1 =r0 = e0; (15)
where Ph1 = Rh=r1(Bh1) is independent of e0, due to the interiority of Bh1 following
from assumption (2). Note from (14)-(15) that the equilibrium price vector at date 0,
(P0;r0), is uniquely determined and does not depend on the probability of a crisis,
1  p: as date 0 investors are protected against a bad shock to the value of their
portfolio by the use of simple debt contracts, they simply disregard the lower end
of the payoff distribution (i.e., the payoff Pl1 with probability 1  p) when selecting
their optimal portfolio.
4.3 Wealth and welfare effects of financial crises
Having shown the existence of a continuum of stochastic equilibria indexed by the
probability of a self-fulfilling crisis, we are now in a position to study the welfare
properties of these equilibria in more detail. We first analyse the way in which
crises affect lenders’ wealth and terminal consumption, and then turn to the effect
of crises on other agents’ utility.
To see why lenders’ wealth at date 1 is contingent on whether a crisis occurs
at date 1 or not, we consider how it is affected by the possible default of date 0 in-
vestors. When these investors do not default, they owe lenders the capitalised value
of outstanding debt at date 1, r0e0. As lenders receive an endowment e1 at date 1,
their date 1 wealth if no crisis occurs is simply W h1 = e1+ r0e0. When investors
do default, on the contrary, lenders’ wealth at date 1 is their date 1 endowment,
e1, plus the residual value of the date 0 investors’ portfolio, r0X0S+Pl1. The latter
expression reflects the total value of lenders’ claims at date 1, with the underly-
ing assets (corporate bonds and risky assets) being in fact immediately transferred
to newly-arriving investors against the promise of a (state-contingent) repayment
at date 2 (this is because, by our assumptions about market segmentation again,
only investors can productively manage those assets).20 Using (15), lenders’ date
20One may think of this arrangement as the outcome of a liquidation procedure whereby assets
are transferred to a new entity (the second generation of investors), with ultimate lenders having lost
part of their initial claim.
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1 wealth, W j1 , conditional on whether a crisis occurs ( j = l) or not ( j = h), is thus
given by:
W j1 = e1+ r0XS0+P
j
1 ; j = l;h: (16)
Obviously, the total quantity of goods available at date 1 is the same across
equilibria, because initial capital investment, XS0, is uniquely determined (i.e., it
does not depend on p). This quantity amounts to lenders’ date 1 endowment, e1,
plus entrepreneurs’ production, f (XS0) ; the latter being shared between date 0 en-
trepreneurs, who gather the surplus f (XS0)  r0XS0 in competitive equilibrium, and
lenders, who receive r0XS0 (recall that P0 is such that date 0 investors consume zero
whether P1 = Pl1 or Ph1 ).21
From condition (2) and the second inequality stated in Proposition 2, we
have B j1 < BF1 <W
j
1 , j = l;h, implying that both possible levels of wealth give rise
to interior solutions for consumption-savings plans at date 1 where ρ1(B
j
1) = τ . If
a crisis occurs at date 1, then lenders’ wealth and lending at that date are W l1 and
Bl1; respectively, while their expected date 2 consumption, from the point of view
of date 1, is τ
 
W l1 Bl1

+ ρ1Bl1 = τW l1. Similarly, if a crisis does not occur at
date 1, then lenders’ expected date 2 consumption level is τ
 
W h1  Bh1

+ρ1Bh1 =
τW h1 . Weighting these possible outcomes with the probabilities that they actually
occur, and then using (16), we find that lenders’ ex ante utility (i.e., their expected
consumption from the point of view of date 0) depends on the crisis probability,
1  p, as follows:
E0 (τW1) = pτW h1 +(1  p)τW l1
= τ

e1+ r0XS0+ pPh1 +(1  p)Pl1

:
E0 (τW1) is decreasing in 1  p, since Ph1 > Pl1 and e1+ r0XS0; Pl1 and Ph1
do not depend on p. Note that it is the selection of the low-lending equilibrium
itself that triggers the crisis which lowers lenders’ wealth and future consumption.
Thus, the utility loss incurred by lenders when a crisis occurs is akin to a pure
coordination failure in consumption/savings decisions –rather than an exogenously-
assumed destruction of value associated with the early liquidation of the long asset,
as is often considered in liquidity-based theories of financial crises (e.g., Diamond
and Dybvig, 1983, Allen and Gale, 1998, and Chang and Velasco, 2002).
21There are two equivalent ways of characterising lenders’ budget sets at date 1: looking at their
wealth, W j1 is assigned to storage and lending, so that from (16) we have W j1 = e1+ r0X0S+P j1 =
S j1+B
j
1; j= l;h; the total quantity of goods accruing to lenders at date 1 is ultimately shared between
storage, S j1; and date 1 investment, X
j
S1, so that e1+ r0X0S = S
j
1+X
j
S1; j = l;h: Since B j1 = X jS1+P j1 ,
these two formulations are, obviously, mutually consistent.
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The effect of the crisis on the utility of other agents is as follows. With
respect to investors, Sections 3.1 and 4.2 have established that both date 0 and
date 1 investors consume zero in equilibrium, whatever the realisation of extrin-
sic (date 1) and fundamental (date 2) uncertainty. Investors’ ex ante welfare is
thus zero in all equilibria. With respect to entrepreneurs, the terminal consump-
tion of date-1 entrepreneurs is f (XS1)  XS1 f 0 (XS1), which is increasing in XS1.
Since XhS1 > XlS1 (see Section 3.3), their ex ante welfare, from the point of view
of date 0, is p
  f  XhS1 XhS1 f 0  XhS1+(1  p)  f  XlS1 XlS1 f 0  XlS1, which de-
creases with 1  p. Date 0 entrepreneurs consume f (XS0)  f 0 (XS0)XS0, where
XS0 = f 0 1(r0) does not depend on p. Finally, initial asset holders’ consumption
is just the selling price of the asset at date 0, P0, which is independent of p. In
short, neither investors nor initial asset holders or date 0 entrepreneurs are affected
by the crisis probability. Lenders are, because the crisis reduces their wealth and
future consumption, and (date 1) entrepreneurs are, because low lending reduces
their investment and consumed surplus.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper offers a simple theory of self-fulfilling financial crises based on the ex-
cessive risk taking of debt-financed portfolio investors. In our model, the interplay
between the amount of funds available to investors, the composition of their port-
folio, and the return that they are able to offer in competitive equilibrium creates
a strategic complementarity between lenders’ savings decisions, which naturally
gives rise to multiple equilibria associated with different levels of lending, inter-
est rates, asset prices and future output. Expectations-driven financial crises may
then occur with positive probability as soon as the economy exhibits (at least) two
possible equilibrium levels of lending, and the coordination of lenders on a partic-
ular equilibrium is determined by an extraneous ‘sunspot’. To be more specific, the
main implications of our model are as follows.
First, holding fundamentals constant, the model is consistent with large co-
movements between asset prices, intermediaries’ leverage, investment and output.
High lending in the boom phase leads to rising domestic asset prices and investment.
Conversely, the credit contraction that takes place during the crisis lowers both,
leading to a market crash and a fall in next period’s output. While the specific
nature of these co-movements certainly deserves further empirical investigation,
the available evidence is strongly suggestive of them, both in advanced economies
(see, e.g., Adrian and Shin, 2010, for the U.S.) and in the developing world (e.g.,
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).
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The second key property of the model is that, even without sunspot-driven
fluctuations, relatively mild changes in the underlying fundamentals may initially
have a mild impact on the equilibrium but eventually trigger large, discontinuous
changes in outcomes. For example, a situation of initially high lending but grad-
ually rising risk-free rate initially has a moderate contracting effect on domestic
lending (so that the return on the latter remains equal to the risk-free rate) as long
as the implied equilibrium adjustments remain local; but a similar mild change may
equally force a discontinuous jump in the equilibrium associated with a crash in
both asset prices and domestic investment. Similar properties follow from limited
changes in the perceived riskiness of the fixed-supply asset.
Finally, swings in domestic lending and asset prices entail opposite move-
ments in international capital flows (i.e., purchases of international risk-free bonds),
implying that a domestic lending boom causes a worsening of the current account
while a lending crunch is associated with a sudden improvement of the current ac-
count.
Apart from demonstrating that credit intermediation based on debt contracts
is a potential source of endogenous financial instability, the model also provides
new insights into the potential welfare costs of financial crises. In our model, the
dramatic reduction in lending and asset prices associated with the crisis equilibrium
has two implications. First, it brings about a reduction in lenders’ wealth and con-
sumption, due to a fall in the total value of their capitalised investment. Second,
the credit contraction associated with the crisis causes a fall in productive invest-
ment and output, and consequently reduces entrepreneurs’ profits and consumption.
Thus, both savers and final producers are hurt by the financial crisis, while inter-
mediate investors, whose risk is hedged by their limited liability, are ultimately left
unharmed.
In as much as our analysis is both positive and normative, it may also have
interesting economic policy implications. While margin requirements and other
regulatory devices may help curb excessive risk-taking, more unorthodox policy
measures may also be effective at stabilising the economy. Consider, for example,
the three-period version of the model, where a self-fulfilling crash leading to inter-
mediaries’ bankruptcy may take place at the interim date. In this context, a Central
Bank that could credibly commit to stand ready to purchase the risky asset in case of
a crash (a typically “unconventional” monetary policy measure) would effectively
kill the possibility of the low-lending equilibrium, thereby efficiently stabilising as-
set prices. We leave the full analysis of the policy implications of our risk-shifting
model with endogenous lending for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We wish to characterise the behaviour of ρ1 (B1) as total loans, B1; vary over (0;∞).
First, note that ρ1 (B1) is continuous and such that ρ1 (∞) = 0 and ρ1 (0) = ∞
(that ρ1 (0) = ∞ follows from Eqs. (9) and (12), which imply that r1 (0) = ∞ and
XS1=B1  0). Although this indicates that ∂ρ1 (B1)=∂B1 must be negative some-
where, the two terms on the right-hand side of (10) reveal that, over a given interval
[Ba;Bb] (0;∞), the change in ρ1 (B1) as a function of B1 is of ambiguous sign.
From equation (10), we have that ∂ρ (B1)=∂B1 > 0 if and only if
 r01 (B1)B21 < (1 pi)Rh: (A1)
Given pi and Rh; (A1) may hold if  r01 (B1) is small enough over some
interval of B1, that is if the interest rate, r1, is not very responsive to changes in
the implied level of safe asset investment, XS1. This in turn holds if f (XS1) is ‘flat
enough’ over the relevant range of XS1, so that r1 = f 0 (XS1) responds only little to
changes in XS1. Using (9), together with the fact that ∂ f 0 1 (r1)=∂ r1 = 1= f 00 (XS1),
the left-hand side of (A1) yields:
 r01 (B1)B21 =
 
Rh+XS1 f 0 (XS1)
2
Rh+ f 0 (XS1)2 =(  f 00 (XS1))
(> 0):
For XS1 2

X ;X

, i.e. when B1 2

X+Rh= f 0 (X) ;X+Rh= f 0  X, r01 (B1)B21
can be made gradually smaller by decreasing the curvature of f (:) over X ;X; in
this case f 0 (XS1) is bounded both above and below, and   f 00 (XS1) can be made
arbitrarily small, producing a value of  r01 (B1)B21 small enough for (A1) to hold
(provided pi 6= 1). The larger is 1 pi , the more likely it is that inequality (A1) is
satisfied, for a given r1 (B1) function.
Consider now the isoelastic case. When f (XS1) = X1 ηS1 =(1 η) ; equation
(9) becomes B1 (r1) = r 1=η1 +Rhr 11 , which in turn implies:
r01 (B1) =
1
B01 (r1)
=
1
( 1=η)r 1 1=η1  Rhr 21
;
where r1 = r1 (B1). From equation (10), ∂ρ1 (B1)=∂B1 > 0(< 0) when r01 (B1)+
(1 pi)Rh=B21 > 0(< 0), that is, when
1
( 1=η)r 1 1=η1  Rhr 21
+
(1 pi)Rh
(r
 1=η
1 +Rhr
 1
1 )
2
> 0(< 0) :
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Defining Y  r1 1=η1 and rearranging, we find that ρ1 (B1) increases (de-
creases) when
Ψ(Y ) = Y 2+Rh

2  1 pi
η

Y +pi

Rh
2
< 0(> 0) :
The expression Ψ(Y ) changes sign over (0;∞) if Ψ(Y ) = 0 has two real
roots, including at least one positive root. A necessary condition for this to hold is
that the discriminant of Ψ(Y ) = 0 be positive, i.e., the following inequality must
hold:
1+4η (η 1)> pi: (A2)
When (A2) holds, the roots Ya, Yb of Ψ(Y ) = 0 are:
Ya;b =
Rh
2
0@1 pi
η
 2


s
1 pi
η
 2
2
 4pi
1A :
Both roots are positive (negative) if 1  2η > (<)pi . Combined with in-
equality (A2), this means that Ψ(Y ) changes signs over (0;∞) if and only if
2η+
p
pi < 1: (A3)
Ψ(Y ) is negative for Y 2 (Ya;Yb) ; and positive for Y 2 (0;Ya)[ (Yb;∞).
Since Y = r1 1=η1 , this means that Ψ(Y ) is negative for intermediate values of r1 and
positive otherwise. Using (9) again, this in turn implies that, provided (A3) holds,
ρ1 (B1) is strictly increasing for intermediate values of B1 and strictly decreasing
otherwise. When (A3) does not hold, then Ψ(Y ) is non-negative and ρ1 (B1) is
decreasing or flat over (0;∞) :
Proof of Proposition 2
The existence and number of equilibria as a function of τ is straightforward. We
focus on the interiority and stability of equilibria when τ 2 (τ ;τ+), but similar
arguments can be used to establish stability and interiority when uniqueness pre-
vails. Interiority. We want to establish that 0< Bl1 < Bh1 < e1. Since Bl1 and Bh1 can
only be positive (otherwise ρ1 would be infinite) and BF < e1 by assumption (2),
a sufficient condition for interiority is that B j1 < BF ; j = l;h: To prove that this is
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the case, first use the fact that ρ1(B
j
1) = τ; j = l;h, together with equations (9) and
(10), to rewrite B j1 as follows:
B j1 =
r1(B
j
1)
τ
f 0 1

r1(B
j
1)

+
piRh
τ
; j = l;h:
Comparing the latter equation with (6), we find that B j1 < BF1 if and only if
r1(B
j
1) f 0 1

r1(B
j
1)

< τ f 0 1 (τ) ; j = l;h:
The expression r1 f 0 1 (r1) falls with r1 since f 0 1 (r1)+r1 f 0 10 (r1)=XS1+
f 0 (XS1)= f 00 (XS1) is negative by assumption (1). Thus, r1 f 0 1 (r1)< (τ) f 0 1 (τ) if
and only if r1(B j1)> τ; j= l;h, which is necessarily true from (10) and the fact that
ρ1(B
j
1) = τ . Stability. Bl1 and Bh1 are (locally) stable since a symmetric marginal
move away from equilibrium by all lenders alters the loan return in such a way as to
move the economy back to equilibrium: with ε > 0 arbitrarily small, ρ(B j1+ ε) <
τ and ρ(B j1  ε) > τ , j = l;h. In contrast, the value of B1 where the ρ1 (B1)-
curve crosses the τ-line from below, say ˜B1, is not stable since ρ( ˜B1+ ε) > τ and
ρ( ˜B1  ε) < τ ( ˜B1 is still a Nash equilibrium, however, since at this point ρ1 = τ ,
making a unilateral deviation from ˆB1 = ˜B1 unprofitable). Notice that in the knife-
edge cases where τ = τ  or τ = τ+ the model has three equilibria, of which only
one is stable.
Proof of Proposition 3
Comparing equations (4) and (8), we have that P j1 > PF1 , j = l;h; if and only if
pir1(B
j
1)< τ; j = l;h:
In equilibrium, ρ1(B
j
1) = τ: Then, substituting (12) into the above inequal-
ity, we find that P j1 >PF1 if and only if X
j
S1=B
j
1> 0;which is always true whether j=
l or h. The second inequality is established in the proof of Proposition 2. There it
is also showed that r1(B j1)> τ , implying that X
j
S1 = f 0 1(r1(B j1))< XFS1 = f 0 1(τ);
j = l,h.
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Proof of Proposition 4
To compute effects of changes in pi and Rh on ρ1 (B1), totally differentiate (9) and
(10) at any given level of lending B1 (so that dB1 = 0), to find:
∂ f 0 1 (r1)
∂ r1
  R
h
r21

dr1+

1
r1

dRh = 0; (A4)
dρ1 =
∂ r1
∂Rh

B1
  1 pi
B1
!
dRh+

Rh
B1

dpi: (A5)
Keeping Rh fixed, equation (A5) gives:
∂ρ1 (B1)
∂pi

Rh;B1
=

Rh
B1

dpi > 0:
Let us now turn to the case of a mean-preserving increase in fundamental
risk (i.e., piRh, rather than Rh, is held fixed). Since ∂ f 0 1 (r1)=∂ r1 = 1= f 00 (XS1),
equation (A4) gives:
∂ r1
∂Rh

B1
=
f 0 (XS1)
Rh+ f 0 (XS1)2 =(  f 00 (XS1))
:
Substituting this and the mean preserving condition pidRh =  Rhdpi into
(A5), we find:
dρ1 =
Rh
pi
1
B1
  f
0 (XS1)
Rh+ f 0 (XS1)2 =(  f 00 (XS1))
!
dpi:
Then, using assumption (1), equation (9) again and rearranging, we obtain:
∂ρ1 (B1)
∂pi

piRh;B1
=
Rh f 0 (XS1)2 (1 η (XS1))
piB1

f 0 (XS1)2 Rh f 00 (XS1)
 > 0:
Thus, whether Rh or piRh are held constant, an increase in 1 pi lowers the
ρ1 (B1)-curve.
Robustness
Imperfectly elastic asset supplies
Our baseline model was built on the joint assumption that risky assets were in fixed
supply, while the supply of international risk-free bonds was completely elastic. It
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can straightforwardly accommodate a situation where the return on international
risk-free bonds reacts to the total amount stored, i.e., where τ = τ (Q1) ; τ 0 (:) < 0
(so that ∂τ (e1 B1)=∂B1 > 0). Then, the fact that τ is increasing in B1 is still con-
sistent with multiple equilibria provided that the τ (e1 B1)-curve increases suffi-
ciently less than the ρ (B1)-curve. Our results also continue to hold if the supply of
risky assets is flexible but sufficiently less so than the production technology. Sup-
pose, for example, that initial asset holders must produce the risky asset at date 1
before selling it to investors. More specifically, assume that there is a continuum of
initial asset holders indexed by i and uniformly distributed along the interval [0;1].
These agents face the binary choice of producing one unit of the risky asset or not
and are differentiated according to the fixed cost they must incur to produce the as-
set, summarised by the function u(i). Finally, assume that u(:) is continuous over
[0;1) ; and that u(0) = 0; u(1) = ∞ and u0 (:) > 0. Under this production technol-
ogy for risky assets, asset producer i produces his asset unit if and only if P1  u(i)
and enjoys a consumption level of max [P1 u(i) ;0]. The marginal asset producer,
i, is indifferent between producing the asset or not, so that P1 = u(i). Since all
producers facing production cost lower than that of the marginal producer produce
exactly one asset unit, the supply of risky assets is i =
R i
0 di= g(P1), with g(:)
u 1 (:), g0 (:) > 0; and where ξ (P1) = P1g0 (P1)=g(P1). How is the equilibrium af-
fected by this generalisation? Note first that the price equation (8) still holds, since
it is determined by investors’ equalisation of returns across assets. However, mar-
ket clearing for corporate bonds now requires r1 = f 0 (B1  iP1). Using (8) and the
fact that i = g(P1) ; this implies:
f 0 1 (r1)+h

Rh=r1

= B1; (A6)
where h(x)  x:g(x). Since h(:) is continuous and strictly increasing, equation
(A6) implicitly defines a continuous, decreasing function r1 (B1). Finally, the loan
return curve ρ1 (B1) is still given by (10), with r1 now defined by (A6) rather than
by (9). Under this generalisation, the NSC for the ρ (B1)-curve to be increasing is
 r01 (B1)B21 < (1 pi)Rh, where r1 (B1) is now implicitly defined by (A6). Inequal-
ity (A1) thus becomes:
 r01 (B1)B21 =
B21
B01 (r1)
=

XS1 f 0 (XS1)+Rhg

Rh
f 0(XS1)
2
Rhh0

Rh
f 0(XS1)

  f 0(XS1)2f 00(XS1)
< (1 pi)Rh
Take any range of XS1;

X ;X

. Over this interval, decreasing the curvature
of f (XS1) reduces the variability of f 0 (XS1) (and renders it a constant in the limit)
and increases the ratio   f 0 (XS1)2 = f 00 (XS1) (to infinity in the limit), thereby pro-
ducing a fall in  r01 (B1)B21 (to zero in the limit) for any increasing function g(:).
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Now using the fact that r1 = f 0 (XS1) we may rewrite the bond-market equilibrium
as follows:
B1 (XS1) = XS1+h

Rh= f 0 (XS1)

:
Since f 0 (:) is decreasing in XS1 and h(:) is increasing in Rh= f 0 (XS1), XS1 is
increasing in B1 and thus uniquely determined by B1. Thus, provided that  f 00 (XS1)
and pi are sufficiently small, ρ (B1)will be increasing over the interval

B1 (X) ;B1
 
X

:
Then, if ρ (B1) has (at least) one increasing interval, there are τ (e1 B1) curves in
the (B1,τ) plane that cross the ρ (B1)-curve more than once.
Risk-averse agents
The assumption of limited investor liability, coupled with the hypothesis of all
agents’ risk neutrality, introduces a great deal of ‘risk-loving’ behaviour in the
economy. This naturally raises the question whether our results are still valid when
agents, especially lenders, are risk-averse. To investigate this case, assume that all
agents maximise a function v(:) of terminal consumption, defined over (0;∞) and
such that v0 (:)> 0, v00 (:)< 0. Entrepreneurs’ choices at date 1 are not altered by this
generalisation, since their terminal consumption is positive and deterministic. It is
easy to check that investors’ decisions are also the same as in the risk-neutral case
provided that they receive an (arbitrarily small) extra terminal endowment e˜ > 0.
Denoting lenders’ terminal consumption by c2 , they now choose individual lend-
ing, ˆB1; which maximises Ev(c2) ; taking aggregate lending, B1, asset prices, P1,
and the interest rate, r1, as given. If investors do not default, any individual lender
having lent ˆB1 receives the contractual repayment r1 ˆB1 at date 2. If investors do
default, this lender is entitled to a share of the residual portfolio, r1 (B1 P1) ; pro-
portional to his share in investors’ liabilities, ˆB1=B1. Lenders thus solve:
max
ˆB1
τ
 
e1  ˆB1

+
 
piv(r1 ˆB1)+(1 pi)v
 
ˆB1 r1 (B1 P1)=B1

:
Solving the latter expression for ˆB1, and then using P1=Rh=r1 and imposing
symmetry across lenders ( ˆB1= B1), we find that any equilibrium lending level must
satisfy:
ψ (B1) pir1v0 (r1B1)+(1 pi)

r1 Rh=B1

v0

r1B1 Rh

= τ;
where, from investors’ optimal portfolio choice, r1 = r1 (B1) is defined by equation
(9) above. Note that when v(c2) = c2 then ψ (B1) = ρ1 (B1) and the latter equality
is reduced to ρ1 (B1) = τ , our equilibrium condition under risk neutrality.
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The existence of multiple equilibria requires that ψ (:) be increasing over
at least one interval of B1. Since we were not able to derive any simple ana-
lytical condition ensuring that this holds, we computed the ψ (B1) function nu-
merically for the isoelastic case, where f (x) = x1 η=(1 η) ; η 2 (0;1) ; and
v(c2) = c
1 σ
2 =(1 σ) ; σ  0; for a variety of parameter values. We found that
ψ (B1) may have an increasing interval if the risk-shifting problem is large enough
(i.e., 1 pi is not too small), and neither f (:) nor v(:) are too concave (i.e., neither
η nor σ are too large).
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